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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Mr. Folk Challenged the Relevance of the Nightmare Hearsay Below

Mr. Folk argued in the district court and in his Opening Brief that testimony from Ms.
Reed that T.R. told her that he had just had a nightmare about "what that bad guy did to me last
night" and identifying Mr. Folk as the bad guy should be excluded because it was not relevant. R
Vol. I, pp. 67-72, 100-102; Tr. 11115111, p. 108, In. 19 - p. 109, In. 12; Appellant's Opening
Briefpp.9-19. In response, the State argues that any challenge to the relevance of the hearsay
statements made after the nightmare was not preserved for appellate review. Respondent's Brief
at page 8. The record rebuts this argument.
Mr. Folk's motion to exclude the hearsay was based on relevance: "The defense moves
the court to exclude the testimony of why the mother, Charity Reed, called the police, in order to
prevent erroneous admission of irrelevant testimony." R Vol. I, p. 67 (emphasis added). Mr.
Folk then set out verbatim IRE 401 defining relevant evidence and IRE 402 excluding irrelevant
evidence. R Vol. I, p. 69. Mr. Folk then explained, "These statements of the mother [repeating
T.R. 's hearsay about the content of his nightmare] are not going to be helpful to the jury in
deciding what is the guilt or innocence of the defendant." R Vol. I, p. 70. Mr. Folk's motion
concluded that the hearsay would be "irrelevant evidence under IRE 402, [it] should be
excluded." R Vol. I, p. 7l.
In the State's response in the district court to Mr. Folk's motion, it recognized that
relevance was the issue - it argued, "The Defendant in his Motion indicated that some of these
questions are not relevant. ... The statements made by [T.R.] concerning what Mr. Folk did is
relevant as that is why this case is going forward." R Vol. I, p. 95-96. The State continued, "The

Defendant also tries to argue admissibility of statements .... There is an argument for excited
utterance and possible other exceptions to the hearsay rule. Mr. Folk does not understand that
one may keep evidence out, but other rules let it in." R Vol. I, p. 96. (The State offered no
citation for any case law that would allow irrelevant evidence to be admitted because, even
though excludable under IRE 402, the evidence happened to be hearsay.) Id.
In reply, Mr. Folk argued that the State was seeking admission of irrelevant evidence.
He wrote: "As stated in the Defense motion, if it's not relevant foundation, it's improper
evidence." R Vol. I, p. 100.
Contrary to the State's argument on appeal, Mr. Folk did raise in the district court the
issue of the relevance ofT.R.'s hearsay made after the nightmare and the issue is preserved for
appeal.
B. Admission of the Hearsay About the Content of the Nightmare was Improper
The hearsay challenged by Mr. Folk is T.R. 's statement explaining the content of the
nightmare: "[H]e told me it was about what that bad guy did to him the night before." "What
bad guy?" "Jon, Jonathan." Trial Tr. p. 198, In. 1-5.
The State argues that this hearsay was an excited utterance because the identification of
Mr. Folk as a bad guy who did something to T.R. the night before was a spontaneous reaction to
the nightmare. Respondent's Briefp. 7. But, that analysis is incomplete - the hearsay although
prompted by the nightmare and discussing the content of the nightmare was about the events of
the night before - not about the events of a few minutes before the statement was made. When
the statement is analyzed in that light, as opposed to the State's erroneous interpretation that the
statement was simply about and would simply be understood by the jury to be about the
2

nightmare and not Mr. Folk's identity as the bad guy who did something the night before, the
statement is inadmissible as an excited utterance. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273
(2007). And, if the State's interpretation is correct and the statement was only about the
nightmare and nothing more - not about Mr. Folk or an accusation against him, then the
statement was clearly irrelevant - because the content of a nightmare does not have any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. IRE 401. A nightmare is just a
nightmare. People dream all sorts of things for all sorts of reasons and dreams, let alone
nightmares, do not reflect an accurate recounting of real events. As such, the content of dreams
and nightmares are not relevant to ascertaining what happened in reality.
Under either analysis, the district court abused its discretion in admitting the hearsay; the
hearsay did not fall within the excited utterance exception and it was not relevant.
C. The Error in Admission of the Hearsay was not Harmless Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
The State has argued that the error in the admission of the hearsay was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,974 (2010) ("[T]he State
shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.")
Mr. Folk has set out in his Opening Brief a full analysis of the State's case and its
weaknesses. Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 14-19. In light of those weaknesses, the State cannot
carry its burden of demonstrating no harm beyond a reasonable doubt.
D. Evidence of Prior Convictions was Improperly Admitted
Mr. Folk set out in his Opening Brief how the district court erred in admitting evidence of
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two prior convictions. The court had admitted the convictions to prove motive, opportunity, and
intent.
In his Opening Brief at pages 26-27, Mr. Folk set out why the prior convictions were not
admissible to prove intent. The State does not make any argument in response on the question of
intent. Rather, ir argues only that the priors were admissible to show opportunity and motive.
Respondent's Briefpp. 12-15. This Court, for the reasons set out in Mr. Folk's Opening Brief,
should accept the State's implicit concession of error and hold that the priors were not admissible
to prove intent.
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Folk also discussed that the prior offenses were probative of
motive only insofar as the jury would draw the conclusion that because Mr. Folk had previously
offended against boys, he was now motivated to commit a new offense against boys - an
impermissible propensity use of the evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 1185,
1190 (2008); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668, 227 P.3d 918,922 (2010); State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1,8-9,304 P.3d 276,283-284 (2013). Appellant's Opening Briefp. 25.
The State has not addressed how the prior offenses prove motive save to say that
"because Folk's prior convictions involving D.P and M.P. show Folk accomplishing molestation
under the guise of innocent childcare or in brief periods of time, they are relevant to show
opportunity and motive in this case." Respondent's Briefp. 15. But, this is no more than
impermissible propensity evidence - to say that the fact that someone did the same sort of crime
before proves a motive to do it again is the essence of propensity. Therefore, the evidence of the
prior convictions was inadmissible. Grist, supra; Johnson, supra; Joy, supra.
The State relies upon State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 152,254 P.3d 47,53 (Ct. App.
4

2011), to argue that the prior convictions were also admissible to show opportunity.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-15. In Gomez, the Court of Appeals held that evidence that Gomez
had previously molested the victim, her sisters, and a friend of one of the sisters while in small
living spaces accommodating up to 12 people, even while the girls were sleeping in beds with
other siblings or their mother, was admissible to prove opportunity and credibility in a case
wherein he was accused of touching the victim while she was asleep in a bed with her sixteen
year old brother. 151 Idaho at 154,254 P.3d at 55. The Court held that the relevance of the
evidence "was not only to Gomez's ability to access the room, but also his ability, in a house full
of people, to surreptitiously enter V.B.'s bedroom, while she was sleeping next to her brother, to
touch her and offer her money to sleep with him." The Court noted, "This testimony was
necessary to explain how and why Gomez was able to abuse V.B. without anyone seeing the
abuse, as her testimony, if considered alone, raised substantial questions as to how such abuse
was possible in a house with little privacy." 151 Idaho at 155,254 P.3d at 56.
Gomez is clearly distinguishable from Mr. Folk's case because the circumstances ofthe

offense in Gomez were very unique - commission of lewd conduct while the victim was in bed
with another person without the other person being aware of the offense. The allegations in Mr.
Folk's case - touching a child quickly in the absence of any prior relationship with the child - did
not involve unique circumstances. A very small sample of such cases includes: State v.
Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794, 641 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1982) (luring passing girl into church); State
v. Taylor, 122 Idaho 218,832 P.2d 1153 (Ct. App. 1992) (entering homes of strangers and

touching children therein); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989) (lewd conduct
with girl who happened to walk by defendant's apartment); State v. Gratiot, 104 Idaho 782, 663
5

P .2d 1084 (1983) (touching girl who was walking near railroad tracks). Furthermore, the prior
convictions evidence presented in Mr. Folk's trial involved the 1992 case wherein Mr. Folk was
convicted following repeated contacts with a boy at a motel while caring for the boy with the
parents' permission where both he and the boy's family were staying over an extended period of
time and the 1999 case wherein Mr. Folk was convicted following a single contact with a
previously unknown child in a laundromat. As the circumstances of the two prior offense were
quite different from one another, the State cannot argue that the two together prove opportunity
in the unique way the prior offenses proved opportunity in Gomez.
In Gomez, the Court of Appeals also held that the evidence was relevant to prove the
credibility of the complaining witness. However, insofar as Gomez holds that complaining
witness credibility may be established by evidence of other bad acts of the defendant, it was
wrongly decided and should be overruled.
IRE 404(b) does not specifically allow proof of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove
credibility. Rather the rule allows admission of prior bad acts evidence for purposes "such as"
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. Credibility is not such a purpose. Credibility of the complaining witness is at issue in
every trial. If prior bad acts are admissible to prove credibility of the complaining witness, then
prior bad acts are always admissible and IRE 404(b) would not exist. Using other bad acts of the
defendant to prove the complaining witness's credibility is simply using the other bad acts for
purposes of propensity - if the defendant did it before, then the complaining witness's testimony
that he did it again is more credible.
Moreover, IRE 608 is a more specific rule that controls the admissibility of proof of the
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character and conduct of a witness, including the witness's credibility. That rule only allows
proof of specific instances of conduct of the witness, not someone else, for purposes of attacking
or supporting the credibility of the witness and sets limitations on the proof used to establish
those instances. IRE 608(b). See Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 841, 864 P.2d 1126, 1128
(1993) ("A specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls
over a more general statute when there is any conflict between the two or when the general
statute is vague or ambiguous.")
Even if Gomez is not overruled, this Court should not accept the State's invitation to
extend Gomez to hold that the prior offenses in this case were admissible to prove the credibility
ofT.R.
Lastly, the State has argued that the district court did not err in weighing the probative
value of the two priors against the danger of unfair prejudice. Respondent's Briefpp. 15-16.
The State argues: "Because the evidence was probative of opportunity, rather than for propensity
alone, the danger of unfair prejudice is diminished." Respondent's Briefp. 15.
There are three flaws in this argument. First, as discussed above, the prior bad acts did
not prove opportunity. They were merely propensity evidence and as such their probative value
was nil and the danger of unfair prejUdice was extremely high.
Second, as discussed above, even if this Court was to find, contrary to all the case law
involving similar cases, that touching a previously unknown child quickly is such a unique
situation that "opportunity" is at issue per Gomez, only the 1999 conviction was relevant. The
facts of the 1992 conviction involved a period of grooming, getting the parents' permission to be
alone with the child, and repeated contacts. Even if the 1999 conviction was admissible, the
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1992 conviction was not and the probative value of the 1999 conviction alone was clearly
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in the admission of both priors.
Third, the State's argument does not address the error in the district court's analysis. As
set out in Mr. Folk's Opening Briefp. 27, the district court concluded that the prejudice of the
prior convictions was not great because Mr. Folk had admitted that he is a pedophile and that he
wanted to change his behavior, but that he also still thinks about molesting children. R Vol. I p.
181. In other words, the district court found that the prior convictions were not overly prejudicial
because the jury already had evidence before it that would allow it to conclude - once a
pedophile, always a pedophile - guilty of this charge. But, of course, that is the opposite
conclusion from that which is allowed by the Rules of Evidence. Under the Rules of Evidence,
propensity evidence is inadmissible. IRE 404(b). And, the State has pointed to no case law
which holds that once some propensity evidence is in, more is not prejudicial. In fact, more is
extremely prejudicial. Not every pedophile sexually abuses children. But, that is a distinction
that can be extremely difficult for people to understand. Even if Mr. Folk's jury panel was able
to understand and apply that distinction, the jurors would very quickly determine that Mr. Folk
was not a pedophile who did not sexually abuse children when they heard evidence, from a
victim and from a victim's mother accompanied by photographs of the victims as they appeared
at the time that they became victims, that Mr. Folk had been criminally convicted twice before
for sex acts against children. The jury would convict on propensity. The danger of unfair
prejudice was extreme - not diminished.
The district court erred both in finding the evidence of the prior convictions admissible
under IRE 404(b) and in the balancing under IRE 403. Moreover, as set out in Mr. Folk's
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Opening Brief, the State cannot demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman, supra; Perry, supra; Coleman, supra. Therefore, the conviction should be
reversed and a new trial granted.
E. Cumulative Error Requires Reversal
Mr. Folk has set out in his Opening Briefhow a new trial is required because of each of
the errors individually. In addition, he has set out how reversal is required under the doctrine of
cumulative error. He relies upon his argument at page 28 of his Opening Brief on this point.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Folk asks that his
conviction be reversed.
Respectfully submitted

thisci~~ay of November, 2013.

Attorney for Jonathan Folk
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